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ARGUMENT 
I. 
MR. MEDEL'S FAILURE TO UNDERSTAND 
THE ILLUSORY PLEA BARGAIN 
ENTITLES HIM TO WITHDRAW THE PLEAS. 
A. MR. MEDEL IS PREJUDICED BY THE INVOLUNTARILY ENTERED PLEA. 
The State concedes that the trial court lacked the authority 
to sentence Mr. Medel in accordance with the plea agreement, 
which contemplated that the minimum mandatory offense, aggravated 
sexual assault, would be treated as a first degree non-minimum 
mandatory offense for sentencing purposes. State's brief at 10 
and n.8. 
However, the State contends that Medel has not met the 
prejudice prong of the plain error or ineffective assistance of 
counsel standards because both the trial court and the board of 
pardons have treated Medel in accordance with the plea agreement, 
as though he were convicted of a non-minimum mandatory first 
degree felony. State's brief at 8-11 and n.9. The State cites 
no authority in support of its assertion that the proper focus in 
assessing prejudice is on whether or not the defendant's 
incorrect expectations were met. 
Contrary to the State's argument, in the context of 
involuntarily entered pleas, the Courts do not engage in a 
prejudice analysis focusing on whether the defendant's 
expectations in the plea bargain were fulfilled. The violation 
of the defendant's substantial constitutional rights in the entry 
of the plea constitutes prejudice in this context. 
This is demonstrated by State v. Pharris, 798 P.2d 772 (Utah 
App.), cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990), wherein this 
Court utilized the plain error doctrine to reverse the trial 
court's denial of Pharris's motion to withdraw the guilty plea. 
The Court stated, 
The Utah Supreme Court has enunciated a two-part 
test for determining plain error. First, the error 
must be "plain," which means "from our examination of 
the record, we must be able to say that it should have 
been obvious to the trial court that it was committing 
error." Second, the error "must affect the substantial 
rights of the accused, i.e., that the error be 
harmful." Id. 
The defendant's guilty plea in this case was 
2 
entered after the Gibbons case was decided. Therefore, 
it should have been obvious to the trial judge that 
strict compliance with Rule 11 was required. In 
addition, defendant's substantial constitutional rights 
were affected by this failure to strictly comply with 
Rule 11. 
Id. at 774 n.5 (citations omitted). 
Pharris is consistent with other Utah cases demonstrating 
that adequate prejudice is established to meet the plain error 
standard in the context of a motion to withdraw the plea, if the 
record reflects that the plea was constitutionally involuntary.1 
B. THE ERROR WAS NOT "INVITED" BY MR. MEDEL. 
The State argues in a similar vein that Mr. Medel invited 
the error involved in his plea to a minimum mandatory offense 
under the understanding that it could be treated as a regular 
first degree felony. State's brief at 11-14. 
Where the record shows that the trial court, defense 
attorney, and prosecutor apparently misunderstood the law which 
See e.g. State v. Breckenridgef 688 P.2d 440 (Utah 
1983)(defendant pled guilty to arson and was sentenced to a term 
of zero to five years; court reversed order denying motion to 
withdraw guilty plea on basis raised for the first time on appeal 
- that defendant did not voluntarily enter the plea because there 
was no factual basis for plea, and record demonstrated 
defendant's lack of understanding of the nature and elements of 
the crime); State v. Brown. 853 P.2d 851, 853-54 (Utah 
1992)(characterizing Breckenridge as "a case of plain error in 
which the Eldredge standard was clearly met."). 
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forbade them from treating a minimum mandatory offense as a non-
minimum mandatory offense, particularly in the absence of one 
scintilla of evidence that Mr. Medel had any legal acumen at the 
time of his pleas, it is unreasonable to suggest that Mr. Medel 
himself managed to plant the error in the trial court. It is 
apparent from the stipulation of the parties that the plea 
bargain was not dictated by Medel, but was the fruit of 
negotiations between the prosecuting attorney and defense 
counsel. For instance, the stipulation entered in the record 
after the pleas were entered states, uIn case CR87-387, it was 
Mr. Cope and defense counsel's intention from the inception of 
the second offer that they would stipulate that Aggravated Sexual 
Assault was a 1 [degree] felony, but not punishable as a minimum 
mandatory offense." (R. 262-263). 
The vast majority of cases relied on by the State in support 
of its invited error argument does not involve an involuntarily 
entered plea.2 The doctrine of invited error normally applies to 
2
 £££ State v. Perdue. 813 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah App. 
1991)(defendant could not attack his own jury instructions on 
appeal); State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993) (defendant 
could not complain of trial court's pretrial ruling which may 
have resulted from the defendant's memorandum incorrectly stating 
the law); State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1285 (Utah 
1987)(defendant precluded from raising jury voir dire issue which 
was expressly waived in the trial court); State v. Tillman. 750 
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intentional tactical decisions made by attorneys, see id.. and to 
the knowledge of defense counsel, has never been applied by any 
Utah court to avoid a claim that a criminal defendant 
misunderstood his plea agreement and the offense to which he 
pled. Compare e,g. State v, West/ 765 P.2d 891 (Utah 1988)(case 
remanded to trial court for determination of whether plea was 
involuntarily entered when it appeared that the parties and trial 
court misunderstood the governing law at the time of the entry of 
the plea); State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381 (Utah App. 1997) (in 
remanding for resentencing to class A misdemeanor, despite the 
parties' belief at the time of entry of plea that offense was a 
third degree felony, the Court made no suggestion that the case 
could be disposed of on the basis of the defendant's having 
invited the error).3 
P.2d 546, 561 (Utah 1987)(defendant could not attack prosecutor's 
argument which was invited by the argument of defense counsel); 
State v. Thompson, 170 P.2d 153, 161-62 (Utah 1946)(defendant 
barred from assailing on appeal jury instructions similar to 
those he himself submitted); State v. Gleason, 405 P.2d 793, 794-
95 (Utah 1965)(defendant's requested jury instruction 
characterized as quasi-invited error, where request for 
instruction could have been made earlier to avoid the error). 
3
 It is noteworthy that in State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381 
(Utah App. 1997), where the State had mistakenly entered into a 
plea bargain in which the defendant was entitled to a lesser 
sentence than expected by the parties at the time of the plea, on 
appeal, the State did not claim that it had invited the error. 
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C. MODIFICATION OF THE JUDGMENT IS NOT APPROPRIATE. 
The State recognizes that under State v. Babbell. 770 P.2d 
987, 993-94 (Utah 1989), this Court may recognize a need to 
correct the illegal sentence currently being served by Medel. 
State's brief at 15. In apparent recognition that correction of 
the sentence would further jeopardize the pleas, the State argues 
that the appropriate remedy is to somehow alter the judgment from 
a minimum mandatory offense to a different first degree felony, 
to which Mr. Medel did not plead guilty. State's brief at 14-18. 
The Utah case the State cites in support of this novel 
suggestion is State v. Bindrup, 655 P.2d 674 (Utah 1982), in 
which the Utah Supreme Court found that the second degree murder 
verdict found by the trial court following a bench trial was not 
supported by sufficient evidence. Id. at 676. Acting pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. §76-1-402(5), the appellate court found that a 
conviction could enter for manslaughter, the next lower degree of 
offense for which there was sufficient evidence. Id. 
Rather, the State claimed that the plea bargain should be 
rescinded because it was founded on a mutual mistake, and claimed 
that the defendant was attempting to take unfair advantage of the 
misunderstanding in seeking the lesser sentence to which she was 
lawfully entitled. 
It would seem that the State's own theory in Patience 
reinforces Medel's claim that he is entitled to withdraw his 
guilty pleas. See id. 
6 
The statute permitting a modification of the judgment in 
Bindrup provides, in relevant part, 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict 
or judgment, or an appellate court on appeal or 
certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient 
evidence to support a conviction for the offense 
charged but that there is sufficient evidence to 
support a conviction for an included offense and the 
trier of fact necessarily found every fact required for 
conviction of that included offense, the verdict or 
judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and 
a judgment of conviction entered for the included 
offense, without necessity of a new trial, if such 
relief is sought by the defendant.4 
4
 The entire statute currently reads, 
§ 76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single 
criminal episode -- Included offenses 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single 
criminal action for all separate offenses arising out 
of a single criminal episode; however, when the same 
act of a defendant under a single criminal episode 
shall establish offenses which may be punished in 
different ways under different provisions of this code, 
the act shall be punishable under only one such 
provision; an acquittal or conviction and sentence 
under any such provision bars a prosecution under any 
other such provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses 
under a single criminal episode, unless the court 
otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant shall 
not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses 
when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a 
single court; and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting 
attorney at the time the defendant is arraigned on the 
first information or indictment 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense 
included in the offense charged but may not be 
7 
By its own terms, the statute has no application here, where 
the conviction is not jeopardized by insufficient evidence, but 
by an involuntarily entered plea. Moreover, Mr. Medel is not 
seeking a conviction on a lower category of offense, but seeks 
the withdrawal of his guilty pleas. 
The other case the State cites in support of its 
convicted of both the offense charged and the included 
offense. An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the 
same or less than all the facts required to 
establish the commission of the offense 
charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, 
solicitation, conspiracy, or form of 
preparation to commit the offense charged or 
an offense otherwise included therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a 
statute as a lesser included offense. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the 
jury with respect to an included offense unless there 
is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the 
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of 
the included offense. 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or 
judgment, or an appellate court on appeal or 
certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient 
evidence to support a conviction for the offense 
charged but that there is sufficient evidence to 
support a conviction for an included offense and the 
trier of fact necessarily found every fact required for 
conviction of that included offense, the verdict or 
judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and 
a judgment of conviction entered for the included 
offense, without necessity of a new trial, if such 
relief is sought by the defendant. 
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modification theory, Martin v. State. 480 N.E.2d 548 (Ind. 1985), 
has questionable legal underpinnings5 and is factually 
5
 The three authorities cited by the Martin court in support 
of its modification of the conviction seem to provide little 
support for the court's order. Subsection (N) of Indiana Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 15, provides the court's general authority on 
appeal, and currently states, 
(N) Order or relief granted on appeal. An order 
or judgment upon appeal may be reversed as to some or 
all of the parties and in whole or in part. The court, 
with respect to all or some of the parties or upon all 
or some of the issues, may order: 
(1) A new trial; 
(2) Entry of final judgment; 
(3) Correction of a judgment subject to 
correction, alteration, amendment or modification; 
(4) In the case of claims tried without a jury or 
with an advisory order the findings or judgment amended 
or corrected as provided in Rule 52(B); 
(5) In the case of excessive or inadequate 
damages, entry of final judgment on the evidence for 
the amount of the proper damages, a new trial, or a new 
trial subject to additur or remittitur; or 
(6) Grant any appropriate relief, and make relief 
subject to conditions. 
Neither this rule, nor any Utah provision cited by the State, 
purports to authorize a court to modify a judgment to reflect a 
conviction for an offense other than the offense pled to. The 
cases relied on by the Martin court are also of little value, 
inasmuch as they both involve correction of erroneous judgments 
following jury trials, and do not involve constitutionally 
involuntary pleas. See Ritchie v. Indiana, 189 N.E.2d 575 (Ind. 
1963)(verdict of rape was not sustained by the evidence; court 
ordered modification of the judgment to reflect a conviction of a 
lesser included offense for which the defendant conceded there 
was sufficient evidence); McFarland v. Indiana, 384 N.E.2d 1104 
(Ind. App. 1979)(following a trial wherein defendant was 
convicted of two offenses, appellate court ordered modification 
of judgment to remove one illegal conviction). 
It appears that no court outside of the state of Indiana has 
9 
distinguishable from this case, in any event. 
In Martin, the defendant was charged with attempted robbery, 
and the record of plea proceedings confirmed that he was in fact 
guilty of only attempted robbery. !£. at 550-551 and n.2. 
Despite the fact that the plea bargain clearly contemplated that 
the defendant would plead guilty as charged to attempted robbery 
in exchange for a recommendation that he would serve only a year, 
the defendant ended up pleading guilty to armed robbery, a more 
serious offense. Id. at 551. After extended post-conviction 
proceedings, the Indiana Supreme Court found that inasmuch as the 
defendant had served the one year contemplated by the plea 
agreement, the fact that he had pled to a charge of which he was 
not guilty did not require withdrawal of the plea. The court 
found that the appropriate action was to modify the judgment to 
reflect a conviction for attempted robbery, in accordance with 
the plea agreement. Id. 
Medel's case differs from Martin's in this important 
respect: Medel's guilty plea was entered under a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the governing law -- that a minimum mandatory 
offense could be treated as a non-minimum mandatory offense by 
ever cited to or relied on Martin. 
10 
virtue of the agreement of the parties. Medel's failure to 
understand what he was doing in entering the legally impossible 
plea renders his plea constitutionally involuntary, and entitles 
him to withdrawal of the pleas. See e.g. State v. Copelandr 765 
P.2d 1266, 1275-76 (Utah 1988). 
Modification of the judgment would be highly inappropriate 
in the case involving a guilty plea, where the validity of the 
conviction hinges on the defendant's understanding of the offense 
to which he pleads guilty, and not on whether a different offense 
might be found to fulfill the "spirit" of the plea bargain. 
Compare State's brief at 17 with e.g. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 
238, 243-44 (1969) (guilt plea unconstitutional in absence of 
record proof that plea was knowing and voluntary). 
D. THE STATE HAS NOT JUSTIFIED THE APPLICATION OF THE LACHES 
DOCTRINE. 
The State asserts the doctrine of laches, and argues that it 
would be unconscionable, some ten years after the entry of the 
pleas, to permit withdrawal of the guilty pleas where Mr. Medel 
has received the benefit of his bargain. State's brief at 17. 
According to Angelos v. First Interstate Bankf 671 P.2d 772 (Utah 
1983), "Laches is not mere delay, but delay that works a 
disadvantage to another. To constitute laches, two elements must 
11 
be established: (1) The lack of diligence on the part of 
plaintiff; [and] (2) An injury to defendant owing to such lack of 
diligence." Id. at 777 (citation omitted). 
There has been on showing that Medel has been lacking in his 
diligence to obtain relief while acting as a pro se litigant 
incarcerated at the Utah State Prison. While significant time 
has passed since the entry of the pleas, it must be remembered 
that Mr. Medel began his efforts to obtain relief within one 
month of the entry of the pleas, on July 2, 1987, when he moved 
the trial court to provide a transcript of his cases, to 
facilitate his "prosecution" of the case under Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 65b(i) (R. 52-56; 163-67; 268-272). Following the 
denial of this motion, Medel's pro se post-conviction petition 
seeking withdrawal of the pleas was eventually filed in July of 
1994 (R. 79), and the case has been in litigation since that 
time. See Statement of the Case, in Mr. Medel's opening brief at 
5-6. 
The State has articulated no prejudice that would befall it 
in the event of the withdrawal of Mr. Medel's pleas. 
Most importantly, contrary to the State's assertion, Medel 
has not received the benefit of his bargain because he currently 
stands convicted of a minimum mandatory offense; and because the 
12 
bargain was fundamentally flawed from the outset by the parties' 
misunderstanding of the governing law, and by the trial court's 
failures to inform Mr. Medel of the rights he was sacrificing in 
entering into the plea agreement. 
Because Mr. Medel was induced to enter his pleas on the 
mistaken belief that the prosecutor and defense attorney had the 
power to exempt his aggravated sexual assault conviction from the 
mandatory sentence required by the legislature, the pleas were 
involuntary, and subject to withdrawal on Mr. Medel's motion. 
Sfifi Copeland, supra. £e£ also State v. West; 765 P.2d 891, 896 
(Utah 1988) (NXX [I]n order to plead voluntarily, a defendant must 
know the direct consequences of his plea, including the actual 
value of any commitments made to him. Where, as here, counsel's 
alleged advice, corroborated by the information supplied by the 
court, grossly exaggerated the benefit to be derived from the 
pleas of guilty, it would follow that the pleas were not 
voluntary.'")(citations omitted). 
E. BECAUSE THE TERMS OF THE PLEA BARGAIN CANNOT BE FULFILLED, ALL 
PLEAS MUST BE WITHDRAWN. 
In footnote 7 of its brief, the State suggests that if the 
entry of the plea to aggravated sexual assault in case number 387 
is considered involuntary, the guilty pleas to the pleas in cases 
13 
280 and 386 should nonetheless stand. State's brief page 9 n.7. 
Throughout the proceedings in the lower courts, the parties 
and courts have recognized that all of the pleas were entered in 
the three separate cases as part of one overriding plea bargain 
(e.g. R. 262-264) . The record in the instant case clearly 
demonstrates that Mr. Medel had no intention of entering into a 
plea agreement unless he would avoid all minimum mandatory 
offenses, and that his entry into the plea agreement encompassing 
all three cases was contingent on the absence of a minimum 
mandatory conviction (e.g. R. 262-264). The lower courts and 
parties have similarly treated Mr. Medel's claims regarding 
various inadequacies in the entry of his pleas as supporting his 
overall motion to withdraw all guilty pleas, which were 
encompassed in the one plea bargain (e.g. R. 315-336). 
The fact that the pleas entered failed to comport with 
Medel's condition and understanding of the plea agreement renders 
them all constitutionally involuntary and subject to withdrawal. 
£££ e,g, Copeiand, supra. &ae also e,g. State v. Gibson, 634 
P.2d 1294, 1295 (N.M. App. 1981)("If a plea agreement is not 
followed in all its parts, the entire agreement is 
rejected.")(citing Eller v. State. 582 P.2d 824 (N.M. 1978)), 
cited in State v. Patience. 944 P.2d 381 (Utah App. 1997) . 
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II. 
THE RECORD AS A WHOLE 
FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 11. 
Mr. Medel maintains the factual and legal arguments set 
forth in his opening brief, and without further argument, asks 
this Court to determine that the lower court abused its 
discretion in finding that the record as a whole demonstrates 
compliance with Rule 11. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the trial court's order denying 
Mr. Medel's motion to withdraw the guilty pleas. 
Dated this . day of \J&r\u<&A--f , 1998 . 
Patrick L. Anderson 
Counsel for Mr. Medel 
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